Assigning blame for lost points at Fulham

Whenever a huge club like Manchester United drop points, it's natural to point the finger.
From within the club, though, hopefully any finger-pointing is done using the thumb; better for our favorite athletes to take accountability for any under-performance.

But on the outside, it helps for analysts and fans to pinpoint singular reasons for deficiency, if only to mass-offer changing ideas to the clubs' decision-makers or simply just rationalize our disappointment.

One of the great obstacles to analyzing a football match is determining how much of a result is due to one team's failure or the other team's success. But one is not exclusive to the other, nor can either team (or any single variable) ever be assigned total blame for whatever result in this dynamic team sport.

Despite that, after United lost the lead twice at Craven Cottage on Sunday, perhaps some opinion-makers and opinion-givers alike aren't giving Fulham enough credit for stifling the larger club on the second matchday in this nascent season.

Hodgsen's Fulham

Roy Hodgsen's Fulham—now coached by Mark Hughes—aren't a forgone three points for England's top sides anymore, largely due to the Hodgsen's influence.

The well-travelled Englishman took over halfway through the 2008-09 season and magically led the side from the absolute brink of relegation. The following season Fulham finished seventh in the Premier League.

Last season was arguably the club's most successful campaign in history. Fulham finished 12th in the Premier League, but reached the quarterfinals of the FA Cup and defeated storied sides Shaktar Donetsk, FC Basel, Hamburg, and Juventus en route to the inaugural Europa League final.

Fulham's recent resurgence from perennial top flight basement-dwellers resulted not only from their manager's wizened tactical acumen and good ol' English leadership. His signings still reverberate positively for present-day Fulham.

Center-back Brede Hangeland looks and plays like Nemanja Vidic—a compliment on both counts, their flat noses symbolizing a nonsensical, physical style. Hangeland joined Fulham the month Hodgson took charge, reuniting coach and player from an earlier stint together at Norwegian side Viking.

He's a player that is sure to garner the club at least £10 million when they inevitably choose to sell him.
Damien Duff seemed to resurge from under a rug when he joined the side two seasons ago, form that continued in the Cottagers' match against Man United.

Players he didn't sign nonetheless were clear to footballingly fuse during Hodgson's uber-successful reign in southwest London. Stalwart Aaron Hughes, the improving Clint Dempsey, somehow Paul Konchesky, and especially Danny Murphy continue to help make Fulham away no longer a plus-ROI "win-to-the-over" parlay.

And to be fair to Mark Hughes, he seems the type of gaffer who won't overthinkingly turn a cohesive unit back into a relegating pile of dogshit.

United aren't perfect

Having hopefully projected that I know more about Fulham than your average pub-fly, there are redder reasons why United only left Thames-side with just the one point.

First, let it be written that if Rafael da Silva started at right-back instead of John O'Shea they'd probably have all three.

The lack of offense the big Irishman is capable of is almost wholly unmitigated by whatever defensive special abilities are in his repertoire: seemingly mostly being big, strong, and slow.

His status as a reliable stopgap applies more to central defense than it should on the wings where his lack of pace and creativity unbalance United, especially when Park Ji-Sung is trading on one wing.

When Antonio Valencia is off-form—something that rarely happened last season, to his credit and United's need—O'Shea and Park are rarely going to be able to compensate in attack. Park is consistently average with the ball, at least at United, and his own utility was diminished, if not voided completely, when Ronaldo left the side in 2009.

Nani is only effective in-form, displaying frustratingly immature decision-making in times of lower confidence. He is also a player who changes form like a chameleon changes color, with the exception that the transformation doesn't take place when it's needed most.
 
United will require the added flare of a da Silva twin on the right-wing when Park is on the field or Nani is off the boil, particularly as Patrice Evra continues to recover from his soul-shattering experiences in South Africa last summer.

Vidic and Jonny Evans will also have to gel quickly and completely for this year's campaign to be a serious one. Rio Ferdinand will likely never consistently feature for United again as he toils away with high-arches and lower-back issues.

Darren Fletcher's player-of-the-year performance last season also basically has to continue into every game this year if red Manchester is to sing in glory come May. Without him defending Scholes' freedom and anchoring the core of the side, the malform of the players around him will be amplified instead of masked.

Scholes' own purely resplendent form must be taped, transcribed, and scorched into our visual memories, but they should also be tempered with reason; there should be no expectation for it to continue consistently throughout the term.

His foudroyant strike against the Cottagers Sunday hearkened back to a game two seasons ago against the same side when Scholes played like he was on some serious ecstasy. Who assumes the creative mantle during the inevitable periods his little legs leak lactic-acid and labor lethargically? Michael Carrick? Lol.

But, as ever, there is not one variable upon which all the others hinge, not in any sport, not ever; despite what pundits'll have us believe by overusing the word "key".

Not even Nani's uncomposed penalty gaffe could assume all the blame for the Red Devils last Sunday.
The English and Asian-speaking world's favorite side will need a little bit from everyone—and a lot from a few certain—to bring another big trophy back up the M-6 into Manchester in 2011.

(Especially without the greatest variable of them all, one afforded to most of their rivals: petty transfer cash)

Top flight penalty misses reveal poor approach from players

Despite advanced training technology, more elaborate research methods, and most importantly, the gross volume of money involved in top-flight football competition, many soccer stars still approach penalty kicks without enough thought.


In particular, Manchester United's Nani proved Sunday at Craven Cottage why his effect as a footballer—at least currently—is one of pomp without procedure, flash without fundamentals.

Quite simply, there are several rudimentary mistakes continually made by players at the elite level each year over.

The run-up

To begin, the literal approach each penalty-taker takes itself is crucial to the placement and success of the ensuing spot kick. Known as the "run-up", most players take roughly five steps before their attempt. Other players take less. Some don't take any.

When a player takes only a few or no steps before his spot-kick, it's naturally harder to drive through the ball, thereby making it more difficult for the player to aim his shot to the far side. Therefore, players who take too few steps in the run-up more often than not will pull the ball (shooting across the body, aiming left for right-footers, right for left-footers.)

But even if a player decides to push his shot towards the far side, without more than three steps to truly drive through the ball, a placed shot into that side will generally lack power.

Therefore, players should always take at least five steps in their penalty run-ups. Otherwise goalies can assume the player will pull the ball (aiming at the near side) and be right more often than they are wrong.

Taking enough steps also allows the taker to push the ball (aiming at the far side) with enough force to beat the keeper even if he guessed correctly.



Below, Nani takes a few stutter-steps and blows his penalty, having tipped his chosen direction in part by his minimal run-up.

Curl towards, not away

Using the instep of a boot to "curl" the ball, when aiming at the near post, also slightly reduces the probability for success. The natural bend of these curled shots (as opposed to curling with the outside of the boot, a more uncommon technique known as the "trivela") take them closer to the keeper, curling away.

However, if you aim to the far post (shooting right for right-footed players, left for left-footed players), the ball bends away from the keeper before curling in towards the inside of the post.

Below Pederson takes a healthy run-up but his pulled, curled shot is blocked by Ben Foster.


Set your goals high

It's a cliche to aim high when setting your goals. Well, there's also a bit of a pun there when it relates to penalty kicks.

Generally, from open-play, it's important to aim shots low because you decrease your chances of shooting over the goal. If your shot is on target (aimed between the goal posts), aiming high gives you extra odds to miss than if the ball was travelling less than eight feet off the ground.

In other words, you can only miss right or left if you keep the ball below the crossbar. But this changes somewhat with regards to penalty kicks.

There are areas of the goal that no man or woman can reliably attend when defending penalty kicks: the upper corners.

The lower corners are more feasibly defended by goalies diving horizontally. But it'd take an eight-foot keeper with serious hops to defend either upper corner from a standing position at goal center.

As long as you can control keeping your shot under eight feet, shooting into an upper corner is far and away the most surefire way to convert a spot-kick—provided you don't balloon it.

Left, down, up, right (b, a, select, start)

Even if you take the safer route and deign to shoot penalty kicks low, there's at least one more thing you should remember.

Shots travelling on or along the ground are more difficult to save than shots travelling even one foot off the floor.

This is because a goalie begins a left or right dive by jumping. In mid-dive the goalkeeper is hard-pressed to defend shots under his body, especially when his arms are outstretched.

So even if the goalie chooses the correct direction to dive, if you keep your shot along the ground, you're odds for success increase, as opposed to shooting a few feet off the ground; that's a keepers bread and butter.

West Ham's Carlton Cole shoots near-post along the ground but took too few steps and telegraphed his intent.


From halves to thirds

Soccer is played on two halves of a field, but more advance analysis of the game divides it into thirds: the defensive third, the middle third, and the attacking third.
For whatever reason, though, the customary tactical approach to aiming a penalty kick is yet to advance from a binary decision.

Which is basically a wordy way of saying that professional players don't shoot the ball down the middle enough, when goalkeepers' often decision to dive left or right makes it a solid mathematical option.

Of the six penalty kicks taken last weekend in the English top flight, the goalie dove to one side every time. This is the prevailing paradigm in top-flight football. Goalies are accustomed to takers choosing a corner, and will almost invariably dive to one side of the goal just as the ball is struck.

On pub teams, keepers aren't likely to dive prematurely. But across the top tiers of the game across the world, keepers expect the shooter to be good enough to find a corner, and will almost invariably dive to either direction.

This means there is a nice niche—at least at the moment—in prevailing professional footballing culture for players to shoot down the middle.

So what's the ideal penalty kick?

Place the ball. Look at the referee until he blows his whistle. Turn-around and walk seven or eight steps away from the goal. In one motion, turn to face goal and begin the long run-up. Combining the top of the foot and the instep, strike the ball high into the far corner, curling inside the post.

Probability is always on the side of the shooter; especially when the right approach is taken. It's wonderful why the best players in the world still display poor decision-making taking penalty kicks, and a greater wonder why their managers let them—especially with all the money often at stake for a straightforward procedure.

Rooney should be rested, but he won't be. (He was)

It's strange to need rest a game into the season. But as shopworn as Wayne Rooney has looked lately, in a vacuum, he'd be riding pine on Sunday at Fulham.

And why not—when at least two of United's other premier strikers appear fresher, and are firmly in better individual form?

But United manager Alex Ferguson's reliance on the storied number nine is more likely to see him start without scoring, than give him well-needed rest on the bench as a sharper Berbatov and Hernandez pair interplay without him.

Rooney recovery

If the last several months have proved anything, it's that Wayne Rooney is not playing good football. He looks physically and mentally drained, and you can hardly blame him.

His touch was very heavy in every lamentable performance this summer with England, and his two recent appearances for Man United since have not been admirable.

As I've written before, his maturation as a player is possibly stunted by gross attention, hype, and wish-fulfillment. He wouldn't be the first young assumed superstar to become conflicted, frustrated, or complacent.

But last season perhaps Rooney provided some empirical evidence to support his class, and fulfil his hype, scoring 26 goals in 32 games.

Without getting into the quality of his goals, or more importantly, the quality and consistency of his play last season, unfortunately, starting 32 games and resting only three times contributes now to his own overburden.
During one of those starts, last March against Bayern Munich, Rooney injured his ankle and was feared out for 2-4 weeks: His manager had him in there next week as United crashed out of the competition.

As soon as the club season finished in May, he began starting for England in World Cup warm-ups and ultimately, as everyone knows, in the Cup itself.

Still seeming slightly injured, with the weight of his nation and beyond on his shoulders, he played really, really bad—like many of his teammates—as England was, once again, rudely awakened from a dream too early.
Taxation and exhaustion would be problems for any player mercifully allowed three weeks rest and recovery after a full year of complete physical and mental investment.

This is amplified for Rooney, as he bore excessive pressure from without to perform like a superhero.
And now, worn and grumpy, he'll likely suffer from his club manager's intractable inclination for starting him regardless.

The great shoehorning


There's a good question somewhere why Alex Ferguson considers Rooney a staple in his starting eleven.
Of course, Rooney gives good cause, generally. Uniquely, he is a forward that tracks back readily, ideal for his manager's dirtiest vice: a sole-striker situation, the 4-5-1.

And in-form, "Wazza" is one of the better strikers in England and perhaps Europe regardless of partner. Also uniquely, though, off-form, he becomes very average and sometimes simply just poor.

At 24, he's still young, but he's a fairly old 24. Rooney started consistent top-flight football at 17. He sort of plays like he's old, too, rarely, if ever, adding new skills to his repetoire, on evidence. He still handles the ball in the exact same manner as he did at 17, but now without the abandon, and he still heavily favors his right foot, something opposing defenders have long-since realized.


Regardless of his natural inconsistency, or his understandable and expected limitations, a knackered player is usually not a useful player. And playing him more only makes it worse. As off-form as Rooney is now, he might as well be off the field. And he should be.

But his manager will continue to play him, either from a skewed perception of his current footballing worth, or as a continuing ode to the media, shareholders, chest-thumping supporters and millions of casual fans, perpetuating Brand Rooney, whether it's quality is reflected on the playing field.

The reputation that largely sells all those jerseys is done no favors, though, when the frustrated, obviously tired Rooney plays poorly for United. Playing poorly is all he's done lately—having not scored since March for club or country—and the trend is likely to continue without rest for his overburdened body and mind.

Break from subscription

Both Dimitar Berbatov and Javier Hernandez have proved to be in better shape and in better form, here, at the beginning of the 2010-2011 season.

The Mexican, Hernandez, at 22, is basically the Mexican equivalent to Rooney. Hugely popular in his homeland, he is a striker who utilizes pace, runs behind the defense, and adept finishing from his repertoire.




All being said, he does all those things, at least right now, better than Rooney. In fact, Javier Hernandez may just be better than Rooney, period. But it'll take some time and experience before that idea is either proven true or accepted globally.

This raises an interesting idea. How long must a player perform better than another before people accept he's better? A few games? A full season? Hernandez has already shown to be quicker than Rooney, and ultimately, I think he will prove to be a better finisher and a better striker.

Berbatov, who is also in good form, benefited from a summer-long rest since Bulgaria didn't qualify for the World Cup.

It may seem counter-intuitive, but United's most maligned striker is actually the staple in any forward pairing. Hernandez and Rooney are similar in style and stature; Berbatov is required to win the headers, drop a little deeper, and link the midfield to attack, while one of the other two burst through on runs.

He's very capable in the role. The Bulgarian, hardly consistent himself, always retains the penchant for sliding through balls to willing forward runners—his ideal partners. He is also inarguably the most gifted ball-retainer throughout the side, benefiting more from guile and balance than brute strength to hold the ball as his team transitions.

Unfortunately, as Hernandez continues to perform and justifiably earn acclaim, it'll probably be Berbatov who's sacrificed for him, if Ferguson's tendencies continue. The gaffer showed last year that he is extremely hesitant to rest Rooney even during times of malform or visible exhaustion.

As Fulham visit Old Trafford Sunday, with Hernandez inspiring imaginations each time he plays, and Berbatov rested, healthy, and generally in form, the time is now to rest Wayne Rooney, if only so he may find his own form sooner than later as another long season unfolds.

Even though Rooney is generally overrated across a world-wide fanbase, a rested, mentally-healthy version of him is still very integral to United's success going forward.

But his ability to remain a top-20 European striker is hampered by constant, fallible expectation he always play, and play like he already belongs in the top three.

Manchester United moving forward into 2011

Manchester United began the 2010-2011 English Premier League with confidence, generally controlling and out-passing newly promoted Newcastle United at Old Trafford Monday.

Paul Scholes enjoyed some sort of renaissance, as he does against poor opposing midfields. Afforded space, he sprayed driven passes willy-nilly to every corner, enabling United to overcome a tepid opening and score thrice throughout the 90.

Dimitar Berbatov scored the opener after Scholes fed him in. The Bulgarian rifled home as you should at a tight angle, low-and-far into the bottom corner, affording an exhale from Old Trafford on 33 minutes.
United's best player last season scored just before the break to make it two-nil, Darren Fletcher turning in Patty Evra's driven cross after it pinballed into the six-yard box.

United newboy and Mexican superstar Javier Hernandez arrived shortly after the break in lieu of a grumpy and off-form Wayne Rooney. United camped out in the Tyneside for much of the half.

On 85 minutes, two United oldboys combined when Scholes chipped cross-field for Giggs to volley home from 18 yards. It was a champagne finish from an aging player who will hopefully be relied on less this season than last.

Start to finish

With a one-match sample size, it's not impossible to prophet good things for United this season, though there are still a lot of question marks throughout the side.

United still don't have a natural left-winger. Letting Tosic leave in the summer means another year of Nani's up-and-downs, and shoe-horning Giggs, Wellbeck, or worse into the role at times.

Manager Alex Ferguson is likely to show a disinclination to sit Rooney in favor of Hernandez, someone—so far—much more sprightly, probably choosing instead to forcedly partner the two when Berbatov inevitably is scape-goated sooner than later.

Apparently van der Sar is going to be #1 in red for yet another season until Ben Amos assumes the reigns; fair enough. Players like Vidic and Jonny Evans have the format to rebound after disappointing seasons last year.

If Darren Fletcher improves again this year, ostensibly becoming the best central-midfielder in England, United's success has a base upon which to rise.

Paul Scholes' ability to stay healthy will be crucial if United fans are to be spared seeing Carrick feature prominently. But beyond Fletcher, Scholes, Nani and Valencia, United don't have great depth in the midfield, which—if anything—could be the harbinger for ultimate defeat this year.

Financially shackled to buy younger replacements, United have relied on Scholes and Giggs for too long already. They'll each have a role to play this season, particularly Scholes, but if Ferguson expects either to feature consistently in a starting eleven throughout the season, then it may just be a long one.

World Cup 2010: England Mediocrity Explained

The Internet will presently be deluged with innumerable narratives explaining or rationalizing England's destruction by Germany in their 2010 World Cup knockout tie.

There are a few that should remain more salient than the countless others, for posterity's sake, before history is revisited, revisioned, and rewritten over and over under the bias of regret and disappointment.

Width

Capello left Adam Johnson at home, meaning England had no natural left-winger—the same issue which plagued their attack in the last two, or even three World Cups.

The Italian manager opted for a midfield of James Milner, Frank Lampard, Gareth Barry, and Steven Gerrard across in England's last two games, essentially employing four central-midfielders across.

The result was a total disability to counterattack or play any meaningful attacking football. If Capello wanted to have a defensive midfield setup, he should have played 4-5-1, with Rooney alone up top, three central midfielders, and two natural wingers. At least then their attack could be released with true attacking, wide players.

Instead, he used a narrower 4-4-2 without any wingers, therefore without any width, and therefore without any flowing or attacking promise.

Defense

Perhaps Capello's first mistake was assigning Rio Ferdinand captain of the squad despite alarming injury concerns. Ferdinand featured only briefly for his club side this year with an omnipresent back issue dating back several seasons. He withdrew from the tournament just weeks before it started.

On form, Ferdinand is arguably England's best defender. And like him, off-form, John Terry is horrible. He was slow, detached, and thoughtless against Germany and was shaky throughout the tournament.

It's hard to begrudge Capello for choosing him and Matthew Upson, but unfortunately for everyone involved neither were good enough— individually or together—at all Sunday. Nor did anyone in England's backline, besides Glen Johnson, inspire confidence at any time in the tournament.

Speed


Terry, Upson, Barry, Lampard, Gerrard, and Wayne Rooney, especially, were plodding against Germany and throughout the tournament. England, as a whole, without Shaun Wright-Phillips and Aaron Lennon, relied almost completely on fullbacks Johnson and Ashley Cole to provide overlapping width and speed.
The English were neither particularly strong or fast. Germany's Miroslav Klose out-muscled and outran virtually every member of England's defense Sunday.

It's one thing to be a quick side that counterattacks through the wings and runs in behind defenses. It's another to be a physical side, winning headers, sticking in and controlling matches. England were neither and did none.

Cultivated arrogance


The attention England garners from the media, domestically and abroad, is significant. However, it's no different—in magnitude, at least—to that found in rabid South American countries, or France or Italy.
The stark difference in the attention and pressure applied by both media and fandom is in the receiver, not the sender.

England's players are largely overpaid by their clubs, the result of surfeit only now rearing its head back upon the owners, as debt piles throughout many Premier League  outfits. As a result, the individual egos of the British are more sensitive and more predisposed to being affected by it, being generally coddled and overly revered from without, and overly complacent, self-indulgent, and vain within.

Their lack of chemistry compounded an evident dearth in skill and athleticism, exposing them as a second-rate national side once again.

Reliance upon an overrated Wayne Rooney

Being one of the most marketed players in the world, it's not totally Rooney's fault that he's one of the most overrated. Each time he touches the ball, casual fans around the globe bate their breath, expecting anything. But there was nothing in his replies in an England shirt in June.

Rooney, on any team, will retrieve the ball on the left side, but doesn't have either the skill or confidence to dribble in that direction. Instead he opts to cut back with his right foot almost invariably.

Without the ability to sell movement to the byline, or the balance to switch the ball between his feet naturally, his offense is completely predictable. His only meaningful moments against Germany were a few fouls that he was gifted with as he ran into German defenders standing in his premeditated path.

Rooney has a low center of gravity and above-average vision, passing skill, and shooting power. But he is not strong enough to out-muscle large central defenders, nor fast enough to (or having the inclination to) make darting runs in behind them.

Therefore he often finds the defender between him and the goal. But what can he do to get past them? He is a very unambitious dribbler. He doesn't even try to create for himself with the ball, opting instead to usually turn back (to his right) to play square or across.

It's disappointing to realize how little trickery the Englishman picked up from a former clubmate—ironically also one of few players vaunted as a world soccer superstar, Cristiano Ronaldo; although the Portuguese striker actually deserves it, and lives up to it.

At club level this year, Rooney scored 26 goals, the majority of which completed United counterattacks through close range headers or tap-ins.

Unfortunately, though, it's hard for a player to push himself to improve when he is constantly being trumpeted as already one of the worlds' best, which Rooney, in reality, is not.

He remains a good striker on a great team at Manchester United, and an average player on a mediocre team in England. In the 2010 World Cup, Rooney played like a grumpy ghost, visible but immaterial, haunting England's dreams instead of opposing backlines.

Epitaph 2010


For posterity, let it be known that Barry, Terry, and Rooney were England's worst players in the tournament. Barry's dribbling, passing, and forward play was wholly regrettable. Terry's frazzle, lack of composure and speed, and insecurity marred his declining reputation. Rooney didn't get sent off, but may as well have been, by the lack of effort and effect he had on any of England's matches again, still scoreless across two World Cups.

Capello was supposed to be the difference to take England to the 2010 World Cup finals. In the end, he was one of the many reasons they crashed out prematurely.

His tactical reversion to vertical attacking play, without natural width (especially on the left) hearkened back to 2006 and 2002.  His inclusion of Heskey instead of Crouch was nostalgic at best.

Employing Gerrard on the left side was an egregious repeating of the same mistake of manager's past, despite it being well-documented and lamented then, and surely again now. Lampard and Barry consistently left huge gaps in front of their defense as they over-committed forward, and not just against Germany.

Without a doubt, Capello's dogmatic and conventional formations, selections, and use of substitutions—in other words, his managing of his side—detracted more than it added for England throughout the World Cup this year.

But he remained, as the last few English managers were, at the mercy of his personnel, a crutch the next manager won't share, as England's current generation will mostly be mercifully cycled out and replenished by 2014, after failing abjectly so far this millennium.

England suffer from tactics and selection, not pressure, likeduhobviously

One day removed from another vacant performance, several English players sat down last night and had a beer with their manager, the Telegraph reported Sunday.

Understandably depressed, as most English fans are, after a numbing nil-nil draw with Algeria Friday, vice-captain John Terry and several other players reportedly expressed their opinions about England's best formation, over vino and pints, to Fabio Capello on his birthday.

Terry spoke of squad division and differing opinions—some red, some blue—regarding what must be done to ensure progression against Slovenia on Wednesday.

It is rumored that several members of the squad believe Gerrard must play closer to solitary striker Wayne Rooney. Another belief present in the squad is that Joe Cole must start. (Hopefully proponents of both realize that the two are mutually exclusive.)

He also implied some rebellion against their stalwart, cerebral manager, stating "When things don’t go too well it is important the lads stay together. That is what we had the other night when we expressed ourselves.’’

Oddly, with all the talk of unity and division, captains and responsibility, there are no quotables from David Beckham. But, if nothing else, the English are good at camaraderie. Ball-busting and banter are part of their footballing culture.

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No, morale isn't much of an issue for the English players. They're mostly too simple to overthink their mateships. Nor is the real problem the media, their country's expectations, or any other arbitrary pressures that all participating sides are struggling to balance.

England's celebrated manager, who made the side appear so attractive leading up to the tournament, despite being a highly-touted tactician, has shifted his strategic paradigm nostalgically similar to his failed predecessors.

When Capello regrettably left Adam Johnson at home, he doomed his side to play like the same-old modern England: hoofing long balls forward, hoping they're nodded on to Rooney, because sadly, like other recent England managers come-and-gone, Capello doesn't have the balls to sit either Lampard or Gerrard in lieu of the other.

Relegating Gerrard or Lampard unnaturally to the left wing, and unimaginatively plopping Heskey next to worker-finisher Rooney, just as McClaren and Erickson did, will see Capello and England fall tragically out of the world's biggest sporting tournament, two years after the same squad failed to qualify for Euro 2008.

Yet against Algeria last Friday, Gerrard was shoe-horned by Capello into the left of midfield just as he, Lampard, or Scholes were in past major tournaments. The result? No width.

Though, it's true, over those several years—and the first game against the United States—Lampard and Gerrard proved they don't work together in the middle of the field, leaving huge gaps in front of their own defense as each of them naturally drifted forward or counter-attacked.

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Therefore, either Gerrard or preferably Lampard must sit to allow the other to play with the holding Barry if England are to succeed Wednesday in a 4-4-2.

The Oggmonster Peter Crouch must replace Heskey if England continue to use this formation. He enables England's blunt attack by winning more headers, being more mobile, having better feet, trickery, and generally better at everything than Heskey. The lanky Spurs forward must replace him if Capello opts to use two forwards.

If, as Chelsea's Terry and Lampard wish, their former club teammate Joe Cole is drafted in against Slovenia, he can certainly help on the left side where England now lack a natural left-winger. But he doesn't offer the width that Shaun Wright-Phillips can on that side.

This makes Cole's best position the right side with SWP on the left. If Cole is in the form that Terry suggests, a flier on him out there couldn't hurt, as Aaron Lennon has failed to impress and seems to prefer impacting games as a substitute, anyway.

If Capello plays 4-5-1, with Rooney up front alone—overestimating, as everyone does, his ability—both Lampard and Gerrard could feature in a five-man midfield with two wingers while Barry holds.

But Rooney himself, it must be said, is more effective with a partner, at club level and beyond: Even while he was tapping in goal after goal for United in a 4-5-1 last season, his outfield play was usually quite mediocre.

Besides, England must win to ensure progression into the elimination rounds. Therefore, Capello must use their most attacking formation. Crouch must be drafted in instead of Heskey, and either Gerrard or Lampard must sit, instead of lampooning either uncomfortably on the left wing.

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Hopefully this was all sorted out in a bevy of man-hugs and cheers as players and manager relaxed Sunday evening to rationalize over pints.

A source from Soccernet said Sunday that Capello's message to his side would be "Just play." Hopefully his desperate players find his terse imploration more profound than spurious.

Their manager's stern propensity for discipline and sense was indeed useful, if not crucial, to changing the failing atmosphere at the England camp post-McClaren. He led the Three Lions through friendlies and World Cup qualifiers with aplomb and authority, garnering respect, if not outright fear, from a usually domineering British media.

But now that the tournament proper is upon them, his side would likely perform better if they were allowed to relax more, by manager and country, heading into the make-or-break match against a stodgy Slovenian side. Their countenance got them here; they no longer need it.

But, any wide range of understandable pressures, egos, affiliations, or the timing of the team-sheet won't add or detract especially from England's performance if their gaffer dogmatically trots out the same uninspired line-up, employing the same dull, vertical attacking style only freshly inscribed on the tombstones of predecessors he once appeared so superior to.

“It does seem like two years’ work was for nothing,” Capello told The Mirror Monday. Hopefully it isn't any more apparent come Thursday morning.